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Nathan Evans* Offshore Petroleum in Australia -
Cooperative Governance in a Sea
of Federalism
Since 1980 when jurisdiction over the offshore was finally settled, divisive
jurisdictional posturing between the state and federal governments has been
reduced Since then. efforts have concentrated on improving the administration
and policy affecting offshore sectors, especially with respect to petroleum
resources. In this context, the inclusion of environmental drivers represents a
natural progression Building upon this enhanced responsibility integration with
other maritime sectors would seem to be the next objective for the petroleum
sector to pursue. Although now mandated by government policy, integration as a
concept challenges sectoral decision-making so fundamentally that the delivery
of integrated ocean policy approaches may be frustrated.
Depuis 1980, alors que la competence sur les regions extracOtidres a enfin 6td
ddterminde, on a constatd une baisse du nombre de prises de position
susceptibles de crder de la dissension entre les gouvernements provinciaux et
federal. Depuis, les efforts ont surtout porte sur 'amdlioration des bases
administratives et politiques qui touchent les secteurs extrac6tiers, en partculier
pour ce qui est des ressources en hydrocarbures Dans ce contexte, I inclusion
d'6l6ments moteurs environnementaux est une 6tape qui s'impose tout
naturellement A partir de cette responsabilit accrue, Iintdgration avec d'autres
secteurs mantimes semble 6tre le prochain objectif que devrait poursuivre le
secteurpetrolier Mdme si elle est ddsormais rendue obligatoire par une politique
gouvernementale, la notion dintegraton s'oppose si fondamentalementi la prise
de decision sectorielle que la mise en oeuvre des politiques int~grdes sur les
oceans pourra dtre affectee
* Lecturer, Marine Studies Programme, University of the South Pacific, Fiji. This paper contains
the author's views and does not in anyway reflect the view of the Australian Government
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It has been stated previously that federalism or divided offshore jurisdic-
tion in the case of oceans governance does not itself cause tensions or
contribute generally to bad policy.' Rather, it is the decision-making
structure \N ithin the federal system that determines the amity or enmity of
inter-governmental relations. In Au.tralia. offshore hydrocarbon develop-
ment legislation establishes a shared policy and administration regime,
under which the Commonwealth and states are essentially equal partners
in decision-making.
The history of the evolution of offshore jurisdiction and the regime for
oil and gas has been treated exhaustively elsewhere.: The Commonwealth's
I Nathan I \an-, & John Bailc,. "Jurisdiction and tflshore Petroleum in Australia: Creating Sym-
metry lictween the Commonwealth and State-., h Sharing Benefit-, and ,,\\oiding Costs" (1997) 34:3
Ocean and Coastal Management 173-204
2. Michael Cmmmchn, "The Mineral l~ploraton and Production Regime Within the Federal
Syten" in Peter Drvsdalc & Ilrofumi Shibata. ed'.. Fd 'ralikn and Rci.".our'e l ,X'lapmenl: The
AUftrahan (a.e I dncv (icorgc Allen and Unwin, 19851. Richard G. Hildreth. "Managing Ocean
Rc'.uurce' New /caland and Australia" (19911 (6 Int'l J. Mar & Coa,,t. L. 89; Donald Rothwell,
"The Legal Framework tir ()can and Coastal Management in Australia" (1996) 33 Ocean and Coastal
Management 41-61.
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constitutional capacity to legislate over the otffhore is now unambiguous.
Ironically, through the very enactment of Commonwealth legislation, con-
straints on state in% olvement in offshore policy have been reversed in favour
of a cooperative approach. Nowhere is this philosophy more evident than
in terms of the oil and gas regime. Indeed, the offshore petroleum regime
is deservedly characterized as a true "'cooperative governance" model.'
Upon closer observation, it can also be seen that over time the
Commonwealth has succeeded in assuming a more assertive role vis-ft-vis
the states but without undermining the cooperation that sustains the
regime.' That is. the precise blend of the Commonwealth and states under
enabling legislation does shift according to the political persuasion of
particular governments. Because the regime is so firmly established,
especially its central tenet of cooperative governance, these shifts do not
challenge or endanger the shared approach to decision-making.
Several recent developments in the policy arena further evidence the
Commonwealth's maturity as an offshore decision-maker. Over the past
few years the offshore petroleum sector has embraced the need for an
environmental policy for its activities. Ne%% regulations compel industry
to pursue environmental objectiN es at all stages of operations. In parallel,
there has been a prolound mo% e towards integrated planning and manage-
ment across all oceans sectors under.Australia s Oceans Polic.5 This new
approach to the oceans brought %vith it high expectations that innovative
ways of organizing and executing marine operations would be found. Un-
fortunately, implementation of this integrated approach has been less than
expeditious, and offshore activity continues to proceed largely on a sectoral
basis, notwithstanding this integration mandate.
In this context. the 1998 Australian Offshore Petroleum Strategy is a
curious expression of policy. On the one hand, the Strategy provides a
coherent, decadal framework to foster further development of the oil and
gas industry, complete with commitments to this end. On the other hand.
though released after Australia " Oceans Policv, it failed to elaborate the
new oceans agenda, revealing a poor articulation between these two
government policies. This article documents these new developments
3. Robert Wilder, "Cooperative Governance. Envinonmental Policy, and Management 4f Offshore
Oil and Gas in the United States" (1993) 24 Ocean Devei. & Int'l L. 41,
4. Constance Hunt, "The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia" (199019 Austra-
lian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Bulletin 103.
5. Anthony Bergin & Marcus Haward, "Australia's New Oceans Policy" (1999) 14 int'l. I Mar.
& Coast L. 387.
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after providing an abbreviated history of the offshore petroleum regime. It
concludes that the oil and gas regime continues to thrive as a model for
cooperative governance, although there is considerable scope for further
improving harmony with other ocean sectors.
I. Jurisdictional Settlements and Offshore Petroleum
Prior to the 1950s. the Commonwealth displayed little interest in manag-
ing marine rcsources. Management of the oceans therefore fell largely to
the statcs. In this regard, perhaps the most influential factor in the evolu-
tion of offshore policy is the fact that every Australian state possesses a
coastline.' All states therefore have Nerv real interests in the offshore and
attach considerable importance to maritime industries. Disputes with the
Commonwvealth only arose in concert with increasing interest in the
exploitation of marine resources, in particular, petroleum.'
The 1967 Australian Petroleum Settlement was the first attempt to
establish an inter-governmental regime for marine resources. The Settle-
ment was designed to provide prospective explorers with security of title
but without addressing the question of offshore jurisdiction. To achieve
this goal, the 1967 Settlement was based upon the enactment of identical
overlapping Commonwealth and state legislation. The Commonwealth's
Petroleum (Submertxd Lanml) Act 196' (Cth.) (P(SL)A) applied to
%katers around the country whereas the state acts applied to those offshore
waters adjacent to each state."' This mechanism avoided the question of
6 The management of ocean fisheries had traditionally been left to the states despite the Com-
monwealth having the clear Constitutional authoritN to legislate in this regard. With respect to the
FishericN .-t 1952 WCth.), for instance, rather than challenging state control over fisheries this Act
created a framework for inter-itate fisheries management by .esting in states the federal authority to
manage fisheries beyond three mile.. See, Anthony James Hamson. "'Marine L ning Resources
P'licy in Tasmania" in Isucain .Austraha "N Marine and I4nta'vdc ht i%, eds.. Richard Herr, R
Hall & Bruce Davis. Unicrsity of Tasmania, Tasmania, 1982 at 69-58.
7 Richard Herr & Bruce Davis. "The Impact of UNCLOS III on Australian Federalism" (1986)
41 Int'l. J 674
X. Brian R. Opekin & Donald R. Rothwell, "Australias Territorial Sea: International and Fed-
eral Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles" 11991) 22 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 395, In addition to
the historic role ofstate a.s marine resource managers, the Commonwealth was also not a significant
land holder. It did not have in place a parallel and easily adaptable system for the disposition of
resources It was natural that regulatory control should fall to the state governments.
9. Ibid.. John L. Taylor, "The Settlement of )isputes Between Federal and State Governments
Concerning Offshore Petroleum Resourc, s Accommodation or Adjudication?" (1970) 11 Harv. Int'l
LJ, 358
10. Petroeun Suhnway'd 1.mIs I Id 1967(Cth I.
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jurisdiction by granting each operator two identical titles. Operators were
therefore assured of the validity of at least one in the event of the jurisdic-
tion of either the Commonw ealth or States being vacated.
Governments were clearly creative in not clarifiying the jurisdiction
of the respective spheres. Ne\ crtheless, the role of the states as traditional
offshore managers was the most influential factor in shaping the approach
to offshore policy in 1967. ' The enactment of overlapping legislation was
a powerful admission of possible state jurisdictional competence.
Moreover, under the Settlement the Commonwealth largely abdicated to
the states its functional capabilities relating to the offshore. The Common-
wealth P(SLA appointed state ministers as Designated Authorities, and
vested in these functionaries all the federal powers and functions pertain-
ing to exploration and production.'2 The states therefore exercised
Commonwealth decision-making capabilities in addition to administering
their own legislation.
Inevitably, this approach to offshore policy perpetuated the states' promi-
nence as decision-makers and resource managers. Following a change of
federal government in the early 1970s. a brief attempt to deprive the states
of an offshore role proved untenable. At that time, the Commonwealth
passed into law the Seas and Submerged Lands Act (SSLA) to
redefine offshore jurisdiction and remo\e the States from any offshore
role. 3 The SSLA declared sovereign rights over continental shelf resources
vested in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth," and vested in the
Commonwealth exclusive soN ereigntv over the three-mile territorial sea. '5
The States were predictably outraged by the SSLA and enjoined in
action in the High Court of Australia." The ensuing case -- .Vew South
I. Nathan Evans. Jur sdictional Dipule.v and the Dvivi.vbpment tpi oilh,or Petroleum Legisla-
lion in Australia (PhD Thesis. Umversit% of TaNmania, I Pvx) (unpublished].
12. Clause 9 of the Settlement stated that the Common Mining Code-the P(SLIA-would be
administered by the Designated Authorty in respect of each State. a role defined by the Petroleum
(Submerged Landsj Act 1967 (Cth i to be the responsible Ntate minister This arrangement raised a
question of Constitutional law that is still yet to be answered- whether the Constitution permits the
power to administer a Commonwealth statute it, be conferred upon a state minister. The Designated
Authority device was created to avoid the judicial review that such a fundamental legal issue would
invite, The Commonwealth's P(SL A refurN to the Designated Authority instead of to the state min-
ister directly, to further raising concerns over the Constitutional legitimacy of the Designated Au-
thority.
13. Seas and Submegd Land .Avt 1973 i( th.j.
14. Ibid.,s, ll,
15. Ibid., s.6
16. Marcus Haward. "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" (1989) 13 Marine Peliv
334 [Australian OCS].
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llc' v the ('ommonivalth -- priwided no relief to the States in their
quest to recover lost territory. In fact. the judgement was actually a regres-
sive step in their efforts to reassert an offshore personality.'" Not only was
the SSLA upheld in its entirety but the Court determined that the
Commonwealth possessed legislative capabilities it had not even contem-
plated when enacting the law,"'
The politics of offshore federalism were again highlighted following a
change of federal government in 1975. Advocating a New Federalism
policy, the government sought to re, ersc the Seas and Submerged Lands
Act framework and readmit the states to an offshore partnership. " As had
occurred in 1967, the two spheres of government settled upon a coopera-
tive arrangement, the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS).2"
The 190( OCS for the first time divided the offshore by creating a
3-mile territorial sea and assigning this to the states. Title to the continen-
tal shelf beyond reN eried to the Common%% ealth. Most reviews of the OCS
tend to emphasise this diN ision of offshorejurisdiction, and the wider policy
dimensions of the arrangement are often understated. More important than
the narrow territorial sea issue was the development of sectoral models
within the OCS framework which enable the states to share decision-
making beyond the three mile limit.
The model adopted for offshore oil and gas was to create a consistent
(mirror) regime across state and Commonwealth waters in place of the
oerlapping regimes which existed previously, The success of the new
petroleum regime is attributable to the three roles given to the states.
Vithin the first three miles the states' jurisdiction is essentially exclu-
sive. The state offshore petroleum legislation vests in the respective state's
title over coastal waters, and the power to legislate and regulate petroleum
development therein. All states have identical legislation which also
mirrors the Commonwealth P(SL)A.
17. Nvew South iales v. The Commonwealh (19751, 135 (.L.R 337 (H.C A.).
18. Richard Cullen. Federahlmn inActiwv Thc ..lUrlhan and Canadian Olhr Disput.es Sydney:
The Ucderation Pres, 19901 at 107 lFcderuliml; Amongst other outcomes. vcu South tlale." v, The
Commiconwcalih. Nupra note 17. determined that Commonwealth jurisdiction oer the offshore vlas
an incident )r federation and had therefore aIuays emisted. but had -simpl. not been exercised.
19 fedcrah.lm, tspno note IX. Austraian t ICS, wupu note I fl.
2(1 Richard Cullen. "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Cae of One Government Too Many?" (1988)
6 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources La\ 213 at 22(1 It ..as not enough for the Commonwealth
to dcirc to readjust the |lfdhorc juri.dictional situation; the judgement v.ith respect to the Seas and
Submerged LandN Acf 1973 (Cth.) represented a legal obstacle that had to be overcome before the
desired political position could be realised
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State ministers fulfil two roles under the ('ommonwcalth P(SL)A in
relation to the continental shelf. The more important role is as a member of
the two-person Joint Authority, a decision-making body comprising the
Commonwealth and the relevant state minister established in respect of
each federal adjacent area." The Joint Authority is vested with vital
functions relating to the initial aw ard and renewal of petroleum instru-
ments-: equivalent to those available to the state minister under the mirror
state Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts. The regime therefore involves
both spheres of go\ ernment directly in petroleum policy, from leasing
through to production decisions.
State ministers also serve as the Designated Authority, continued
under the Commonwealth Act but modified from 1967. Under the OCS,
the major powers and functions previously exercised by state ministers
were transferred to the newv Joint Authority.23 The role of the Designated
Authority post-i 9NU was redefined to be concerned with supporting petro-
leum recovery rather than with policy decisions. To this end, the
CommonN\ealth P(SL)A assigned to the Designated Authority a range of
administratve responsibilities.-" In performing these functions, it needs to
be emphasized. the state ministers actually exercise executive powers of
the Commonwealth, in addition to those shared as the Joint Authority.
The OCS i, an enduring attempt to settle the role of the Common-
wealth and states in offshore policy. As suggested earlier, the arrangements
reached in 1967 had the effect of firmly emplacing the states as offshore
managers. For its part, the federal government came to accept the legiti-
mate place of the states as partners in offshore policy, and was cognizant
also of the logistics of offshore activity and the need to involve the states
in regulation and control. Clearly then, the states in 1980 continued in an
offshore role that reflected both their historic role and the need for
assistance in offshore operation. The irony, of course, is that the High Court
had denied states this very role.
21. Supranote 1Os.M.
22. IR.S. Forbes & Andr;s G. Lan , .uhstruhan tWimn.g and Pencanw' Laws (Sydney: Butterworths,
1987).
23. Supra note 10. s. 14.
24. For example. these include the advertisment of block, renewal of exploration permits, appli-
cations for production licences, and works to be carried out,
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. Amending the (/flfhorv Pelrh'un Legislation
The Peidleun (Submeriged Lands) Act 1967 (P(SL)A) has been amended
many times since the new settlement was reached.2" Even following the
OCS in 1980, for example, the Designated Authority was the functionary
empowered to direct production licence holders to increase the rate at which
petroleum was being recovered. Put another way, this expansive power
a% ailable under Commonwealth legislation was exercised solely by state
ministers. In I 19,4, the Commonwealth amended the P(SL)A to replace the
Designated Authority by the Joint Authority and to also enable Common-
wealth revenue to be taken into account when issuing directions to vary
the rate of production." In combination, these changes enabled the Joint
Authority to tailor individual licence decisions to meet national policy goals,
rather than this being a state prerogative without the benefit of a national
perspective. Several years later the Commonwealth amended the act to
remove other anomalies that persisted from the original 1967 arrangements
relating to the location of decision-making po,%%ers.
2
"
During the 1990s. following settlement of the roles of the Designated
and Joint Authorities, most amendments were designed to clarify opera-
tional aspects of the regime. The first such amendments were passed in
1991 to enable the Joint Authority ministers to delegate to agency execu-
tives all the Joint Authority powers. including those relating to leasing and
development." The effect of these amendments was to shift the burden of
much decision-making to agencies and relieve ministers of the minutae of
minor decisions.
A number of other amendments were passed over the decade to further
elaborate or refine requirements pertaining to exploitation. These included
such matters as:
* payment of securities;
* occupational health and safety;
, renewal of pipeline licences,
* the effect of offshore boundary changes on titles;
* new oilfield infrastructure; and
, release of surrendered areas."
25 Marcus Haward. in B. Gallian, 0. Hughes & C. Valsh. eds.- Inergwernentai Relations and
Puhhc Prjhcy (S~dncy: Allen and tn\ m, I 4%) II
26 Ietr~hcun I~uhmnycd Land,) Amendment k'h I 9'4 tCth,}
27. It..v,hgg, tSuhmnrgcd Lani.j ,mnwnmeni I 18 (Cth.).
2X Pti rlui (Suhmvr'd Landj imhni hi 1991 (Cth,),
29. Pctroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act's I Y42, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000 (No. I & 2)
(th..
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Just when it appeared that federalism within the P(SL)A was well settled,
the issue of inter-governmental roles was reopened again in 2001."
At that time, the Joint and Designated Authority roles were again adjusted,
reflecting subtle but distinct views, between political parties at the federal
level, of inter-goxernimental relations.
The catalyst, as it \as at many junctures of the offshore saga, was a
change of federal government. As had occurred in 1975, the Common-
wvealth took the % iew that many functions of the Joint Authority should be
transferred back to the states as the Designated Authority. The Common-
wealth government portrayed the amendments as clariling roles, mini-
mizing duplication and shifting administrative responsibilities to the states."
The Opposition. advancing its view of the role of the Commonwealth in
the P(SL)A regime, rejoined that
although we support the bills, we make a qualification in that we do not
agree that it is automatically advantageous to gi e to the states and
territories some of the administrati' e functions that this bill is referring
back to them ....
We know that this government has an ideological bent to refer and give
back to the states as much as it can. We think that in many cases that is the
wrong way to go and that it is better to keep a national perspective.
particularl\ on petroleum ... (WIe reserve the right to revisit these matters
of administration when we are back in govemment in the near future."
It will be interesting to observe the policies of the Commonwealth when
the Government next changes. On the one hand. the offshore oil and gas
regime has clearly attained a stable and enduring status - or maturity in
terms of cooperative governance. Equally, though, the precise blend of
Commonwealth/state roles within the P(SL)A regime is still subject to some
adjustment by the currents of federalism flowing at a particular time. The
best evidence of the regime's maturation is the fact that its foundation
shared decision-making by both spheres of government is never questioned
as a principle and approach. This stability and durability in turn allows
other matters to be addressed albeit belatedly. It is to these developments
that this article now turns.
30. Petmleum fSubmerged Landj 4mendment.4(' 2001 (Cth.).
31. Austl., Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamenlarv Debates (6 December 20100)
at 23443.
32. Austl., Commonwealth, Senate, Parliamentary Debates (5 April 20011) at 23807.
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Ill. Austrlhn 0/b I/wrex Petroleum Sntm'v
In 19f99, the Government released the Australian Offshore Petroleum
Strategy as a framcN\ork and commitment to further develop the offshore
oil and gas industry on the continental shelf"' Over the next five to ten
years, the broad objectives of the Strategy are to:
create more certainty in terms of the future release of areas;
* improve the availability of exploration data; and
ensure that regulation and fiscal aspects are internationally
competitive.
The impetus for the Strategy is the depletion of offshore reserves -- at
annual rates of 13.6% for crude oil, 4.8% for condensate and 4% for
natural gas. Consequently. new reserves need to be discovered if petro-
leum ,clf-sufficiency Is to be maintained. In this regard, the Australian
continental shelf has been only lightly explored. For example, three
million exploration wells haN e been drilled in the United States contrasted
to just 7400 in Australia; of these, only 1100 are offshore although 90% of
Australian oil and gas is sourced from this area."' Whilst it is possible to
extract more petroleum from mature fields. the Strategy identifies frontier
areas as holding the greatest prospects for future discoveries. On this
matter, Australia's intention to claim an extended continental shelf by 2004
is reiterated.3
The pillar of the Strategy is continuation of the successful area release
program, designed to optimize exploration of the continental shelf.
Characteristics of the release program include:
" regular annual area releases N% ith two closing dates;
" advance (1N month) notification of new release areas:
* selection of mature, immature and frontier fields;
* the turnover of relinquished, surrendered or cancelled areas; and
* pre-release environmental impact assessment of areas.
The practice has been to offer larger permissions to explore in pioneer
areas to encourage reconnaissance and drilling activity. To expedite
33 Au,,tl. Commonwealth. Department of Industry. Science and Resources, Australian Offshore
Pc't~hwn .n~w~~i (Canberra, Department of Industry. Science and Resources, 1999).
34 Ibid.
35. Article 5f of the United Vatwnms (nienthin mi the Law o'the S'a. 10 December 1982, U.N.
Doc. AVO )NI (Q 122 (UN( L(S) pro-vides for States Partics to claim extended continental shelves
I .CS) beyond 200i miles if natural prolongaton so allows Along with other wide margin countries,
Australia stands to gain appreciahly from this provision of UNCLOS.
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exploration and exploitation of individual leased areas, the P(SI)A
provides for the surrender of unused areas, conversion of exploration
permits to production licenes. and mandatory work programming.
The Commonwealth and State go ernments - as the Joint Authority
-- decide upon the release program, but expressions of interest from
industry "have been a significant factor in deciding the composition of
recent releases."3" The Strateg\ commits to review ing the release program
every two years. in consultation with industry and the States. It is also
recognized that the release program may be varied in response to volatile
factors such as the highlv globalised nature of the oil industry, new data
gathered by industry, and goN ernment generated research.
The Strateg. emphasizes the importance of the pro% ision of infbrma-
tion to policy makers and the public. The P(SL)A requires the pro\ ision to
government of industry-derived information and its subsequent public
disclosure. After the continuous accumulation of data, and with the
increasing interest in otl',hore exploration. revisions to the delimitation of
areas offered for release A ere introduced to maximize the application of
geoscientific information. One particular initiative aims to link all open
file data repositories, data sets and indexes into a national internet site,
with links to the APEC Network of Minerals and Energy Databases. As
well, there are efforts to improve and maintain the integrity of data. For its
part, the Commonwealth boosted its support of national geophysical off-
shore mapping b\ S33.3 million o~cr four vcar ,'
It is noteworthy that the Strategy reported that Australia' favourable
position as a country for undertaking exploration is partly due to the
administration of the offshore petroleum regime. Indeed, the Strategy notes
that despite low oil prices and the very competitive market fbr explora-
tion, Australia is ranked as the second favourite destination for oil and gas
investment. Despite the administrative functionality of the regime, the
Government has committed to further improving the P(SL)A. For example,
to encourage the rerelease of areas for exploration, permits will be renew-
able for a defined period, including the surrender of half the area under
tenement. Also, in the event of preferred applicants declining an offer,
applicants would be ranked to allow reversion to second placed bids.
The Strategy also proposed the amendment of the P(SL)A to provide
36. Supra note 33 at 10.
37. Offshore geophysical mapping is also intended to a.-ist with preparing claims for an ECS
under UNCLOS.
38. Supra note 33 at iO.
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for a new form of title over processing, storage and offloading facilities. 9
Complementing this amendment, the term of production licences was made
indefinite to replace the existing requirement for periodic renewal. ' This
change was introduced to cater to major projects such as liquefied natural
gas ventures with long lead times. including overseas marketing.4
Through the Strategy, the Government also announced a substantial
reform to the regulation for offshore oil and gas. Its intention is to shift
certain provisions from the P(SL)A to regulations promulgated
thereunder. The rationale is to build into the regime flexibility for opera-
tors wishing to adopt new technologies. Time will reveal the efficacy of
this approach, which is not without concerns. There must be assurances
that community expectations are not overlooked in accommodating indus-
try innovation. In this light, it is preferable for the protection of the public
interest to include these assurances as substantive provisions in the parent
act rather than in subsidiary legislation.
Finally, the Strategy refers to the value of guidelines in reducing costs,
both to industry in terms of compliance and to the government for admin-
istration. Guidelines for production licences were issued in 1997, and those
for retention leases and pipeline licences are in the process or being finalised.
Consistent with the direction in other countries, guidelines will also be
drafted for decommissioning offshore structures. 2
IV Environniental Poli and Ofl,/uorv Petroleum
The promulgation of new environmental regulations in 1999 is the most
progressive move by the petroleum sector towards a demonstrably
sustainable basis for operations. Preparation of the Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) O.tIanigentent of Environment) Regulations, 1999 (Cth.) was driven
at least in part by new Commonwealth legislation enacted in that same
year which both expanded and clarified the Commonwealth's role in
protecting and conserving the environment4 Before this time, the capac-
39 This pilicy Aus enacted with passage of the Ptnvum (Submetgd Lands) Anendment Act
€.Vao I) :2000 1 cth I,
411 Ptrnplun (Subhnmg(d Landt .4rmendment Act (N\u1) 1Y, (Cth.).
41 Supra note 33 at 16,
42 In the beginning of 1998, the International Maritime Organisation resolved that no new off-
shore oil struourc would be deployed on the continental shelf after 1999 unless it was capable of
being fully removed.
43. PNvltium (Submerged Land() Ohm(IA -nv.nlt of Emvnnent Regulations 1999 (Cth.).
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it, and willingness of the Commonwealth to intervene in environmental
affairs wN-as the subject of perpetual and protracted disputation with the
states principally, but also with industry groups and non-government
organizations. A number of %ery high profile disputes between the
Commonwealth and the states were in fact determined in court.' The
absence of a clear policy position from the Commonwealth as to its roles
and responsibilities with respect to the environment was apparent4 5
As a result of the internecine 1980s and 1990s. the Commonwealth
finally determined its position towards the environment with the concept
of national environmental significance (NES). Hereafter, the
Commonwealth would involve itself in NES matters. NES matters were
environmental issues w ith clear national implications or with international
dimensions. The six identified matters of NES are:
" World Heritage areas:
" wetlands of international importance,
* migratory species:
" threatened species and communities:
* the marine environment; and
• nuclear activities.*'
This new policy was given effect by the enactment of new major legis-
lation, the Enviroxnment Pirotection and Biodiversinv Conservation.4ct 1999
(EPBC). The EPBC establishes a battery of mechanisms, many of which
are quite creative, to involve the Commonwealth in environmental protec-
tion and the conservation of biodiversitv. Much of the intervention capac-
itv stems from NES triggers: if an NES matter is potentially impacted by
an activity, this triggers Commonwealth environmental assessment and
approval by the Environment Minister.
The EPBC approach to environmental protection represents a remark-
able contrast to the pre-existing regime. Under the previous legislation,
federal environmental impact assessment (EIA) was discretionary and
driven by the Minister responsible for Resources. Unsurprisingly, the
limitations of that earlier regime were widely recognized and subjected to
44 Gerry Bates, Environmental Law n u.siraha, 4th ed, (Sydney: Butterworths, 1999).
45. K. Walker, ed., 4ustrahan Enrinnm'nial PhY (Sydney: New South \ales University Press,
1992).
46. See, Explanatory Memorandum - Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Bill,
1998.
47. Emironment Protectiimn and Bindiersl'
,
Cmnenrvion..(I 1999 (Cth.).
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%Nell founded criticism." In the case of" oflshore oil and gas, continental
shelf de%'clopments were virtually excused from Commonwealth environ-
mental o\ ersight. Only once was an offshore proposal subjected to formal
EIA: even then the activity in question vas a full oilfield development
rather than exploration activity, a topic treated in greater detail elsewhere.'
In this climate, the EPBC seems almost an affront to the way that off-
shore oil and gas has traditionally discharged its obligations relating to the
environment. All stages of development now potentially trigger EIA,
including very tight timing and reporting requirements, and public
scrutiny,
In 2002, the first full EnN ironment Impact Statement (EIS) for an
offshore petroleum development propo,,al was prepared under the new legis-
lation, triggered by three NES controlling provisions: threatened species
and communities. migratory species. and marine environment.5 0 The EIS
exhausti\ ely attempts to document and e aluate the environmental issues
associated wvith the project over its t\\enty Near life. As well as satisfying
environmental appro\al and assessment requirements, the EIS wvill serve
the purpose of meeting other statutory permitting requirements, such as
those relating to parks and wvildlife under the one comprehensive statute.
In this context, the drafting of regulations under the P(SL)A could be
construed as an attempt by the petroleum sector to reclaim some of the
jurisdiction surrendered under the EPBC. Essentially, the new P(SL)A Regu-
lations establish an internali/ed EIA system for the petroleum industry. As
stated:
The object of these Regulations is to ensure that any petroleum activity in
an adjacent area is carried out in a way that is consistent \ ith the principles
of" ecologically sustainable de\elopment, in accordance with an
environment plan that has appropriate environmental performance
objecti\ es and standards as well as measurement criteria for determining
whether the objectives and standards are met."
4 X Michael Crommeln, "Commonwealth lnvolvement in En\ironment Policy. Past. Present and
Future" i 19873 4 Environmental and Planning Lam Journal 101. Robert J. Fow ler, "Environmental
Impact Assessment: What Role for the Commonweath? - An Overview" I i 996) 13.4 Environmental
and Planning Iau Journal 246, Jennifer Ki,,,,. "Eploration and Environmental Issues" (I111)0) 64 5
Law In,,titutc Journal 398,
4). Nathan F\,mn,, "' )tlsihorc ()i Update,." I5 2 .4usralian Mining and Petrleunm Law .4ssocu-
min Law Bdldlin I 16. supra note I
50 \uodside Petroleum Lid.. '\\A-271-P Field Dekelopment Draft Fnvironmental Impact State-
ment" 2111321 online: Woodsidc http / ,
51. Supra note 43. ".3.
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Petroleum acti% ity is defined %er broadly by the Regulations to include
all surveying and drilling, construction, installation, operation, modifica-
tion, and decommissioning of facilities (including pipelines). It also
includes storage. processing and transportation of petroleum. Activity also
means any proposed activity or stages thereof.V 2
The regime revolves around the need for an environment plan for any
petroleum activity, only activities in conformity with an accepted
environment plan may be carried out." The Designated Authority may
consent to activities outside of the environment plan, but only if no signifi-
cant additional effecta or risks will result.54 Similarly. operations must be
discontinued if ncN% environmental effects or risks arise, unless the risks
are provided for in the environment plan."
There are tight time limits and expectations on the Designated Author-
itv in terms of accepting the environment plan. Under Regulation 1 If I.
The Designated Authorit% must accept the plan within 28 days if it:
a. is appropriate for the nature and scale of the activity; and
b. demonstrates that the environmental effects and risks of the acti% ity
vill be reduced as much as reasonably practicable; and
c. demonstrates that the environmental effects and risks of the activity
N% ill be of an acceptable level: and
d. provides for appropriate environmental performance objectives,
environmental performance standards and measurement criteria; and
e. includes an appropriate implementation stratcg. and monitoring.
recording and reporting arrangements: and
f. complies with the Act and regulations."
The environment plan can be resubmitted by the operator if it is unsatis-
factory, or may be approved in part (for particular stages of petroleum
operations), or subject to limitations or conditions.57 The Regulations
provide considerable elaboration on the contents of environment plans, all
of which are familiar to EIA practitioners - the activity and environment
must be described, impacts identified and evaluated, and environmental
objectives, standards and criteria included."
52 Ibid., rr. 4, S.
53. Ibid., rr. 6. 7.
54. Ibid. r. 7(3).
55. Ibid.. r.8.
56. Ibid., r. I .
57, Ibid.
58. Ibid., r,13.
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A commendable addition to the regime is the requirement that an envi-
ronment plan include an implementation strategy. Several innovative
features are worth highlighting. The systems, practices and procedures for
meeting objectives and standards must be specified in the implementation
strategy. A chain of command delegating roles and responsibilities for imple-
menting the environment plan must be established, as well as measures to
ensure that employees and contractors are aware of and trained for imple-
menting the environment plan. Quantitative records of emissions and
discharges must also be kept, and monitoring, auditing and reviewing
environmental performance are required.5 ' A novel requirement is to
identify staff responsible for the environment plans designed to improve
accountability for environmental performance.
There are provisions relating to revision of the environment plan.
Before making any unanticipated changes to operations, or if significant
new en ironmental risks or effects arise, operators must submit a revised
environment plan. The Designated Authority may also demand of an
operator a rex ised environment plan with few fetters. While the Operator
may question the need for the re\ isions, the regime is clearly predisposed
towards the Designated Authority.' Environment plans must be revised
after five years,"
The Designated Authority may withdraw acceptance of environment
plans on several grounds. Non-compliance with the parent act (the P(SL)A)
or directions thereunder may result in withdrawal. In terms of environ-
mental non-compliance, grounds for withdrawal include: failure to
comply with the environment plan; continuation of petroleum activities
once new risks or effects have emerged; and failure to revise an environ-
ment plan once these provisions have been invoked.' Withdrawal of
approval is made independent of any prosecution for offences stemming
from non-compliance with the Regulations. 3
Several miscellaneous regulatory provisions are worth mentioning
brietly. Those relating to reportable incidents and record keeping are
intended to ensure that the industry maintains, in a retrievable format,
59. Ibid-.r 14
60. Ibid., r. I X.
h1, Ibid., r. I%
h 2 Ibid., r. 23.
63. Ibid., r 25 The penalty for most offences is a fine of $8849), applied on a continuing basis for
the duration of the offence. Also, courts may fine body corporates up to five times the penalty ap-
plied to an individual.
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authoritative records for assessing the performance of operators." The
regulations also establish an environmental standard for discharges of pro-
duced formation water -- no more than 50mg/L at any time, and an aver-
age of 30mgL over a one day period.6- Finally, there is an emphasis on
assigning a single identifiable operator to each petroleum activity."
Although motivated by EPBC assessment and approval requirements,
this new regime evidences a clear shift towards an environmental basis for
petroleum operations. The demands now placed on the offshore petroleum
industry are not trivial and even partial satisfaction will represent a
generational commitment towards genuine sustainability of the sector.
However, upon closer scrutiny there appear a number of deficiencies with
the regime in terms of moving towards better governance for sustainability.
The absence of public input in the environment planning process is the
largest deficiency in the regulations. Simply put, there is no requirement
to solicit public feedback nor expose drafts for public review. The imple-
mentation strategy must provide for "'appropriate consultation with other
relevant interested persons or organizations" and is the only avenue for
public involvement."' However. no public input is sought in developing or
approving the environment plan. or with monitoring or reporting environ-
mental performance. One of the very defining characteristics, indeed
strengths, of EIA is its very public nature. For this reason alone, it is hoped
that environment planning under the P(SL)A Regulations will not be
accepted as satisting the new assessment requirements under the EPBC.
Another worrying aspect of the petroleum assessment regime is that it
revolves around the Designated Authority as the approving authority.
Concerns with this approach are twofold: a state minister is charged with
making decisions in relation to the Commonwealth marine environment,
and this minister is a resource minister rather than a minister responsible
for the environment. As described above, the Commonwealth has finally
clarified its role in environmental policy through enactment of the EPBC.
The marine environment is identified as a matter of national environmen-
tal significance (NES) and therefore falls within the Commonwealth's
bailiwick. However, by making the Designated Authority - a state minis-
ter - the competent body, the P(SL)A Regulations represent a contradic-
tion to this approach and send a mixed message regarding Commonwealth
64. Ibid., rr. 26,27.
65. Ibid., r. 29.
66. Ibid., rr. 30-38.
67, Ibid., r. 14(9)b),
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policy. Indeed, it is surprising that this schizophrenic approach was
approved by the (government.
The other concern with the approach is empowering a minister respon-
sible for petroleum development to grant environmental approval. It would
be absurd flor the [nvironment and Heritage Minister to administer the
P(SL I \ Regulations, and this is not suggested. Howe\er, the regime would
be validated by pro\ iding for input from other interested ministers.
.\ third, broad set of limitations on the petroleum regulations is the
lack of proN islons regarding public reporting. As described earlier, new
demands are imposed on industry regarding the maintenance and provi-
sion of records. Unfortunately, there is no provision for reporting to the
public on environmental perfonance through the compulsory monitoring
or rc\ic\ of on\ ironment plan,,. nor release of emission or discharge
records, nor reportable incidences. Such rccord, are only available to the
Designated Authority (including delegates) and inspectors. M The EIS has
been superlati\ e in terms of transparency and public consultation, and the
proponents are to be commended tr their efforts in this regard.69 How-
ever. in the absence of the EPBC, it is a matter of speculation as to whether
the proponents would ha\e been quite so committed to consulting with
local community and interested stakeholders.
On balance, the P(SL).\ Regulations demonstrate a commitment to
improving the environmental performance and sustainability of the
offshore petroleum sector. The fact that activities cannot be carried out
\ ithout an environment plan is a most welcome move. In the context of
the e\pansi\c EPBC asses,ment and approval requirements, ho\Ne\er the
\alue in requiring a separate environmental evaluation under the P(SL)A
could \alidly be questioned. The P(SL.)A Regulations are most valuable
because not all proposals for offshore oil and gas will be subjected to a
fbrmal EIA under the EPBC. In these situations. the P(SL)A Regulations
will ensure that operators address environmental issues with some degree
of rigour and integrity. Therefore, despite some obvious potential for
duplication in both process and content, the EPBC and petroleum regula-
tions in combination will contribute greatly towards sustainability of the
sector,
( 5 Iild. r 2X
69 Mulwad Pelnovilm Lid. Viqua mioic 510 In addition t. the I IS. the proponent prepared an
incredibly delAicd report nunibering over I(i!pagcs in responc to public comment and submissions
received during prcparation of the EIS. Under the Regulation. the proponent would have been un-
der no ohigation to prepare this document and did so because of EIA requirements under the EPBC.
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V Australia s Oceans Polier
The Commonwealth Government released Australia s Oceans Policv
(Oceans Policy) at the end of 1998, to coincide with the International Year
of the Oceans.' The importance attached to the marine environment and
its resources by the Commonwealth is evidenced by the fact that the Oceans
Policy was developed over two years. Australia s Ocean Policy is based
on the proposition that inter-sectoral conflict and environmental degrada-
tion of the oceans has been minimal, due more to good fortune than to
functional management arrangements."' In anticipation of the inevitable
increase in oceans users, with likely corresponding conflicts and loss of
environmental quality, the Commonwealth acted to establish a system for
oceans planning and management capable of addressing these issues.
Despite the connotations of its title and the fact that it is administered
primarily by the Environment and Heritage Minister, the Oceans Policy is
not a conservation instrument. The twin pillars of the Oceans Policy are
industry development and environment protection. "'Australia 'V Oceans
Policy is neither solely an environment protection policy nor solely an
economic development policy. It is both. It is a Policy for the ecologically
sustainable development of our oceans."- The tenet of the Oceans Policy
is that only by preserving Australia's oceans will the commercial potential
of maritime industries be realized.
To this end, Australia s Oceany Polic' is distinguished by two
approaches designed to ensure the ecological sustainability of the oceans.
The most obvious of the two is the shift towards an ecosystem-based man-
agement of Australia's oceans. Regional marine plans (RMPs), the core of
the Oceans Policy, are the instruments through which this new manage-
ment paradigm will be designed and delivered.73 Based on large marine
ecosystems, the purpose of RMPs is to improve linkages across jurisdic-
tions, between all sectors and uses (commercial, recreational, non-exploit-
ative).' 4 The Oceans Policy states that
Action now to put in place a comprehensive system for integrated ocean
planning and management will reduce the risk of a progressive decline
70. Austl., Commonwealth, National Oceans Office, Austruha'N Ocwans Pw),l (Canberra: Maine
Group, Environment Australia, 1998).
71, Ibid.
72. Ibid. at 3.
73. Supra note 5.
74. Supr note 70 at 11.
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and irreversible damage to our marine systems, In this way we will be
able to present environmental. economic, social and cultural losses that
would reduce options for the future.-
The Oceans Policy provides some policy guidance about regional marine
planning. The essential steps are as follows:
" assess ocean resources on a biogeographical basis,
" understand current uses of those resources and emerging pressures;
" evaluate the needs for ecos% stem health and integrity, and impli-
cations for sectoral activities and conservation requirements;
* propose ocean resource allocations, deli ered principally through
existing sectors, using multiple-use principles to generate income
and employment and to optimize long-term community benefits;
" assess and control external impacts of proposed resource uses;
* monitor the performance of ocean planning and management; and
* maintain responsive flexibility within this broad framework.
Regional marine planning will rely hena ily upon environmental, economic
and social information. Integrating these data through a single manage-
ment tool will allow for a structured and orderly allocation of and access
to resources across and %N ithin sectors. Through this process, it is hoped to
both enhance security for maritime industries while retaining management
responsiveness to any unforeseen impacts. RMPs will be binding on the
Commonwealth and its agencies2'
The broad, complementary approach to sustainable oceans use embod-
ied in the Oceans Policy is enhancing sectoral measures and arrangements.
A series of project initiatives for all marine sectors are committed within
the Oceans Policy, including the offshore oil and gas industry.7" The sectoral
initiatixes recognize that future growth in offshore extractive industries
such as petroleum and minerals, is constrained by the availability of
capital for high risk investments and long lead times until commercial
maturity.71 Specific initiatives in the Oceans Policy are generally crafted
in recognition of this fact. One such initiative is the commitment to the
continued promotion of development by disseminating overseas informa-
tion about the titling and taxation regimes for offshore development. Simi-
75. Ibid. at 8-9.
76 Ibhd at 13.
77. Au.tL, Commonwealth, Commonwcalth of Australia, Austruha * Oceuns Polio: Specific
SectoraI l fia~ws (Canberra: Environment Australia, 1998).
78, Supra note 70 at 26.
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larly, the Oceans Policy also commits to developing new technologies for
better understanding offshore prospectiv ity."
In terms of initiatives related to sustainability, the Oceans Policy
commits to removing the restriction on establishing marine protected
areas (MPAs) over pre-existing leases. Extant legislation prevented an MPA
from being declared in respect of an area already the subject of an offshore
petroleum title, in deference to the superiority of the latter. Relaxing this
restriction will "ensure that the development of the petroleum industry is
fully compatible with integrated ocean planning and management ... with-
out compromising pre-existing rights."' ' Allowing the co-existence of two
forms of tenure or status in an area of the ocean is an essential concept
underpinning integrated oceans use.
Other specific sectoral measures are designed to further improve
sustainability of the sector. Australia :v Oceans Policy commits the
Commonwealth to developing a policy on the decommissioning and
disposal of offshore platforms. The Commonwealth will also continue to
gather baseline data and monitor impact assessment outcomes and under-
take to continue consulting with stakeholder interests affected by
petroleum operations."'
An elaborate new structure is established to administer and implement
the Oceans Policy, and RMPs in particular. The peak decision-making body
is the National Oceans Ministerial Board, comprised of six key oceans
ministers with responsibilities for fisheries, science, resources, tourism,
environment, and transportation. The Board %%ill make decisions relating
to RMPs, determine budgetary allocations and expenditures of Oceans
Policy funds (more later), and generally promote coordination and deliv-
ery of sectoral measures.
A National Oceans Advisory Group (NOAG) comprised of about twenty
members, is also created to represent major non-governmental interests
and stakeholder perspectives. NOAG is advisory to the Board on broad
strategic matters and cross-sectoral and jurisdictional issues. Its unfettered
lines of communication to oceans ministers (acting as the Board), provide
key oceans users with a line of direct ministerial access.
Regional Marine Plan Steering Committees will be established to over-
see the development of RMPs for each of the eight identified large marine
79. Supra note 77 at 14,
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
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ecosystems found in Australia. These Steering Committees will be exper-
tise-based and include approximately seven members. In conception, at
least, the Steering Committees should be instrumental in determining the
content of RMPs.
The fourth organ created by the Oceans Policy is the National Oceans
Office (NOO), a new agency of the Commonwealth Government. The NOO
broadly supports the Board, NOAG and Steering Committees through
secretariat seer ices, technical support, and program delivery. As the lead
agency for delivering the Oceans Policy, the NOO will largely direct the
development of RMPs, and address oceans-related matters on a govern-
ment-wide basis.
Announcement of the Oceans Policy was accompanied by the release
of S50 million for the first triennium of implementation. Of this amount,
S32.5 million was identified for RMP development while the balance was
allocated to deliver a number of sectoral initiatives.Y2 The expectation is
that renewal funds will be made available over the out-years, principally
for pursuing regional marine planning.
Clearly..4ustvilia , Oceans Polic'" is a substantive exercise in policy-
making. "1 A newv paradigm for oceans use has been adopted and an admin-
istrative apparatus appropriate to the neN% challenges has been created. The
Commonwealth has also invested a sizeable sum of money in the venture.
Despite these very encouraging elements, the Oceans Policy labours
under a number of constraints which have frustrated expeditious delivery
of the new oceans program.
Likely problems \ ith the implementation of the Oceans Policy have
already been identified in one of the few published assessments. 4 It was
foreseeable that establishing a ne\\ federal agency to lead the delivery of
Oceans Policy would delay the delivery of initiatives. particularly regional
marine planning. 4usfralia :v Oceans Policy was released at the very end
of 1998, with regional marine planning scheduled to commence early the
following year and a review of implementation due in mid-2000. As it is,
the process to prepare the first RMP did not commence formally until April
2000. and the first tangible output of preparations, a Description Paper,
was produced at the end of 2001.
Another of the Oceans Policy's obvious shortcomings is the absence of
82, Scnator the lion. Robert Hill, News Releasw "World First Plan to Safeguard our Oceans" (23
December 1998).
$3, Supra note 5.
84, IhM,
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state participation or endorsement. Notwithstanding its name, .husiraia .'
Oceans Polic is a creation of the Commonwealth for its own use; as stated
earlier, it is this jurisdiction which is bound by RMPs. During develop-
ment of the Oceans Policy there N as some hope that it w\ould eventually
become truly national. However. towards the end of 1998, much to the
chagrin of some observers of the process, it became clear that the Oceans
Policy would evolve into a Commonwealth policy. There are disappoint-
inglv few initiatives within the Occans Policy to secure the future involve-
ment of the states. To illustrate. "In developing Regional Marine Plans, the
Commonwealth will seek the participation of the relevant States and Terri-
tories, to ensure, as far as possible. the integration of planning and man-
agement across State and Commonwealth waters."" Efforts over the four
years since the Oceans Policy NN a- announced have failed to entice state or
territory governments to become parties. At least one commentary doubts
that the Commonwealth would act assertivelx to compel or presume state
endorsement.",
To a large extent, the challenge of operationalising ecosystem-based
management explains implementation failure. Despite a wealth of
material exploring the general concept, there are few concrete examples
on w'hich to base actual practice. In other words. the task of converting
ecosystem-based management from its conceptual basis to prescriptions
on the water accounts for much of the delay in developing the first RMP.
At a minimum, the traditional management ofsectoral uses N% ill be revised
or reformed. Without any indication as to the tbrm and content of an RMP,
it is no surprise that integrated oceans management has been so sloN\.
Another fundamental difficulty lies in reconciling the tension between
moving toN\ards R\IPs on one hand while retaining, even enhancing,
existing sectoral arrangements on the other. Existing arrangements with
all oceans sectors are preserved due to the stability and workability of the
Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) sectoral regimes. At the same
time, the purpose of RMPs is to integrate activities across sectors, altering
the paradigm and practice of oceans use. The Oceans Policy provides little
guidance on how to simultaneously satisfy these two seemingly contradic-
tory mandates.
The Offshore Constitutional Settlement remains the basis for the
management of specific sectors across juri.dictional boundaries. However,
85. Supra note 70 at 11.
86. Supra note 5.
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consideration will be given to administrative changes that may be needed
so that the full range of cross-jurisdictional issues can be addressed
effectively in implementing the Regional Marine Planning process.87
Therefore, the outstanding question for all sectoral uses relates to the sort
of changes to OCS administration that will be made through RMPs. The
alignment of regional marine planning with the P(SL)A regimes is no
better elaborated in the particular case of offshore oil and gas. The
(ioernrnent will:
build on existing petroleum and minerals management regimes to
incorporate ecosystem and cross-sectoral considerations in an integrated
approach to marine resource use and decision-making that is consistent
% ith the principles of ecologically sustainable development and multiple
and sequential use: this will be undertaken through the Regional Marine
Planning process."
The Oceans Policy suggests that the offshore resource regimes will some-
how be adjusted as a result of regional marine planning. The removal or
replacement of P(SLA mechanisms is not on the agenda; these will be
adjusted to on an 'integrating basis.' Again. the Oceans Policy provides
little guidance to practitioners or administrators in this pursuit.
Legislation NN ill inevitably be needed to deliver RMPs. Instruments
issued under the P(SL)A can only be altered through the enactment of
superior legislation to compel the integration of oil and gas activities with
other sectors. Australia s Ocean Policy commits to RMPs as a mechanism
for integrating oceans uses. To give effect to this policy, however, there
will need to be legislative action.
It is not difficult to appreciate why operators who hold costly permits
or licences issued under the P(SL)A may harbour misgivings as to the
future security of their costly holdings. Whilst instruments will continue
to be issued under authority of the P(SL)A, the extent to which these will
yield to the prescriptions of ecosystem-based management under an RMP
is unknown. As Bergin and Haward note, RMP preparation could take years
to complete meaning these issues will not soon be settled." In the interests
of meeting its twin imperatives of environmental protection and resource
X7, S qwa note 70 at 17.
88. S qura note 77 at 13,
89, Supra note 5.
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development, it behooves all involved to settle the scope of RMPs, and
therefore legislative reform, with all expedition.
Co(nchision
Despite a chequered history of offshore federalism - a feature common
to many federations - the framework for allocating jurisdiction offshore
has endured and became established. In this context, the legislation for the
oil and gas sector is exemplary in terms of settling the roles of the
Commonwealth and states in a cooperative go% ernance regime. New envi-
ronmental requirements now exist under both petroleum and environment
legislation. further highlighting the natural progression of the offishore
petroleum regime. As this sector gains experience in administering these
two parallel sets of requirements. it will become increasingly worthy of
emulation in other federations.
Simultaneously, the advent of Ausnralia " Oceans Policy forces all
marine users to revisit the precepts of oceans use. It is no longer sufficient
to conduct marine activities on a strictly sectoral basis. All oceans users
must be organized in such a way that the interactions between sectors,
both exploitative and non-consumptive, are identified, anticipated and
managed.
Regional marine planning has met with considerable delays since
being adopted as Government polic.; even those directly involved in the
Oceans Policy are concerned with the tardiness of progress.'m Delays of
this nature have eroded some of the initial enthusiasm that accompanied
the release of Australia :" Oceanm Polity. For those less enthusiastic about
RMPs, any delay in moving forward with the new oceans regime is no
doubt welcomed as it ensures that traditional arrangements will continue
unchanged. Indeed, some would argue that the functionality of the sectoral
regimes is evidence enough that the system is working and any additional
administrative architecture is superfluous.
On the other hand, moving towards cross-sectoral integration does
represent a logical next phase in ocean policy, building upon the OCS frame-
work. The basis of the Oceans Policy is that only by integrating activities
can the future health of the marine environment and sustainable use of its
resources be assured, Regardless of the argument, support for the Oceans
90, Geoff Wescott, "National Oceans Advisory Group Update" (2111121 Wav 16,
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Policy will erode the longer that it fails to demonstrably deliver. There is a
real risk that the entire oceans initiative may disappear from the political
agenda.
In any case. Aushralia \ Occun. Polic ' has circumvented debate on the
need l. r integrated oceans planning as the agenda has now been firmly
established. What remains to be determined is the actual form that integra-
tion of marine activities will take. It is hoped that the cooperative
goN crnance tenets characterizing ocean policy over the past two decades
will be prcscrxed in the regional marine planning initiative.
